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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law - Texas Savings and Loan Act-
Provision Granting Judiciary Power To Determine if Pro-
posed Association is Needed Violates Separation of
Powers Provision of the Texas Constitution
Gerst, the Savings and Loan Commissioner of Texas, refused Nixon's
application for a proposed savings and loan association charter. Gerst's re-
fusal was based on his finding that there was no public need for the
proposed association and that the new body would unduly harm an existing
association. On appeal, the district court concluded that Gerst's findings
were incorrect and were not supported by substantial evidence. The court
of civil appeals affirmed.1 In the Texas Supreme Court an intervening
savings and loan association contended that the savings and loan act was
unconstitutional insofar as it required the district judge to determine
material facts on the preponderance of the evidence. Held, affirmed: The
provision of the Texas Savings and Loan Act which vests in the court
the power to redetermine whether a proposed association is needed, or will
unduly harm an existing association, is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution. How-
ever, the provision of the act making the record of the Commissioner's
hearing the basis for determining if his action is supported by substantial
evidence is valid. Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966).
Section 2.08 of the Texas Savings and Loan Act' provides that the
Savings and Loan Commissioner shall not approve any charter applica-
tion by a proposed savings and loan association unless he affirmatively finds
that there is a public need and that the association would not unduly harm
the operation of an existing savings and loan association. Section
11.12 (5) (b) provides that on appeal the trial judge shall redetermine
these fact issues by a preponderance of the evidence, but that no evidence
shall be admissible which was not adduced at the hearing before the
Commissioner. On the other hand, the Texas Constitution expressly pro-
vides for separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of the government.'
The supreme court found that to permit the judicial branch to re-
determine the facts found by the Commissioner, a member of the executive
branch, allowed the judicial branch to assume powers of the latter and
therefore violated the express constitutional requirement of separation of
powers.
After excising the objectionable clause under the severability provision
of the act,4 the court sought to determine whether the remainder of sec-
1Gerst v. Nixon, 399 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
a TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a (1963).
3 TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1.4 Acts of 1963, $Sth Leg., ch. 113, § 3.
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tion 11.12 (5) (b) validly limited the trial court to the record of the
Commissioner's hearing in determining if the order was supported by
substantial evidence. Under the Texas substantial evidence rule, the trial
court usually makes such a determination on evidence produced in open
court under the rules of evidence.' The intervening petitioner contended
that all of section 11.12 (5) (b) was invalid and that, therefore, this usual
method should apply. The result of this argument would be to keep the
record of the Commissioner's hearing out of evidence since it contained
inadmissible testimony, and thereby put an impossible burden on Nixon
to prove that the Commissioner's order was not supported by substantial
evidence. The supreme court upheld this portion of the statute because
the legislature has the power to establish the method for determining if
substantial evidence supported the order.
The decision is in line with previous Texas cases.' In proceedings which
are legislative in nature, the courts have been denied the power to re-
determine facts found by an administrative agency. However, the decision
seems to give the legislature new power over the judiciary, by allowing
the denial of a method evolved in the judicial system-a separate trial
de novo to determine if there is substantial evidence. Thus, it would seem
that the court, though keeping separate this function of the executive
branch, has allowed the legislature to encroach on the power of the
judiciary.
M.N.M.
Constitutional Law - Right to a Fair Trial- Reduction
of Prejudicial Publicity by Standing Federal Court Order
Seymour, a television news photographer, took photographs of a de-
fendant and his attorney in the hallway outside a courtroom. The de-
fendant was being led from the courtroom at the termination of his
arraignment proceedings. Seymour's conduct was in violation of a standing
order of the federal district court, Northern District of Texas, prohibiting
the taking of photographs in connection with any judicial proceedings
on or from the same floor of the building on which the courtrooms are
located.' After being cited for criminal contempt for the violation, Sey-
mour contended that enforcement of the order as promulgated represented
'See Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule: Texas Version, 5 Sw. L.J. 152 (1951).
'Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963); Key W. Life Ins. Co.
v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1961). Cf., Scott v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
348 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964).
'Misc. Order No. 381 (December 17, 1965) subscribed by each judge of the Northern District
of Texas provides: "It is ordered that the taking of photographs or broadcasting or televising in
connection with any judicial proceeding on or from the same floor of the building on which




an unconstitutional prior restraint upon the freedom of the press. The
trial court found Seymour guilty of criminal contempt and fined him
$25. Held, affirmed: In the interest of maintaining judicial decorum and
the preservation of an atmosphere essential to a fair trial, federal courts
have the power to issue standing orders which reasonably prohibit the
taking of photographs in connection with any judicial proceeding. Sey-
mour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
Due process requires that the criminally accused be tried in an atmos-
phere which is conducive to a fair trial and free from prejudicial outside
influences.! Insuring that the accused does receive a fair trial has become
more difficult because modern mass communication devices have a pro-
found and pervasive effect upon the general public and upon potential
jurors. Thus "courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside influences."' In considering
the effect of extensive publicity upon the rights of the accused, the
earlier approach of the United States Supreme Court was to make a care-
ful examination of the facts of each case to determine if prejudice has
actually resulted.4 In Rideau v. Louisiana' the Court departed from its
earlier approach, however, and established the current principle that where
the procedure used involves the probability that the accused will be
prejudiced, due process is lacking, regardless of whether actual prejudice
could be shown.
Prior to the instant case, the taking of photographs in the courtroom
during the process of judicial proceedings was not permitted in federal
courts.! The court in the instant case, however, recognized that modern
mass communication devices necessitated that trial courts be given broad
latitude to insure that the accused receives a trial free from threat of
prejudicial publicity. In upholding the constitutionality of the standing
order, the court construed the order as prohibiting the taking of photo-
graphs during the existence of a judicial proceeding, whether in process,
recessed, or terminated. Thus the power of the court is not restricted to
the time when a proceeding is in process or court is in session, but now
extends even after the specific judicial proceeding in question has been
recessed or terminated.
The decision broadens the federal district court's power to remedy at
its inception potentially prejudicial publicity in an effort to preserve for
the accused "the most fundamental of all freedoms," 7 a fair trial. The
court followed the principle that freedom of the press should not be con-
strued to give the press "a constitutionally protected right of access to
sources of information not available to others."' The right of the accused
2 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
3 Ibid.
'Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
s 373 U.S. 723 (1963). Accord, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
'FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
'Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
' United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954).
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to a fair trial free from prejudicial outside influences must remain para-
mount to another's ability to gather information solely for the purpose
of informing the public.
F.W.M.
Corporations - Ultra Vires - Shareholder Intervention
Moody sought to recover on a promissory note executed in the name
of Inter-Continental Corp. by its president and attested by its secretary.
The corporation pled, among other defenses, that the officers and directors
of the corporation were without authority to execute the note and it was
thus ultra vires and unenforceable. Richardson, an Inter-Continental share-
holder, sought to intervene in the suit under article 2.04B(1) of the
Texas Business Corporation Act' to enjoin the payment of the note, on
the ground that it was an ultra vires transaction given in satisfaction of
a personal obligation of the Inter-Continental president. On Moody's
motion the trial court struck the intervention and granted a motion for
summary judgment against Inter-Continental. The trial court found that
the intervenor was not acting in his own behalf, but was sought out by
Inter-Continental to make the plea and the latter arranged to employ
intervenor's attorney. Held, reversed and remanded: Where a shareholder
seeks to enjoin an act of his corporation that is ultra vires and asserts this
statutory right by intervention in a suit pending between the parties who
must be joined if the shareholder initiates the action, his intervention
should not be stricken. There should be a hearing on the merits, under
appropriate pleadings, in order to determine if the intervenor is acting
in collusion with the corporation. Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody,
411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
The court held that article 2.04 TBCA abrogated the doctrine of in-
herent incapacity in Texas and that ultra vires is only available as provided
in article 2.04 TBCA.' Therefore, the defense of ultra vires is unavailable
to a corporation, but may be pled by a shareholder if all parties to the
transaction are parties to the suit and the court deems the proceeding
equitable. The case was remanded for a determination of the intervenor's
rights. It was an error to strike intervention, but relief should be denied
the intervenor if, on remand, the trier of facts finds that he is but an
agent of Inter-Continental. a
'TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04B(1) (1956). "[Blut that such act, conveyance, or
transfer [of a corporation] was, or is beyond the scope of the purpose of the corporation as ex-
pressed in the articles of incorporation or inconsistent with any such expressed limitations of
authority may be asserted: (1) In a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin
the doing of any act." The Texas Business Corporation Act is hereinafter referred to as the TBCA.
'Tsx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04B (1956); Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411
S.W.2d 578, 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. See also Bar Committee Comment follow-
ing article 2.04, 3A VERNON'S ANN. CIv. STAT. 40 (1966); Brimble, Ultra Vires Under the Texas
Business Corporation Act, 40 TEXAS L. Rrv. 677 (1961); Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 861 (1966).
'TEx. R. Civ. P. 60; TEx. Bus. Costp. ACT ANN. art. 2.04B (1956); 411 S.W.2d at 589-91.
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Inter-Continental is the third Texas case discussing ultra vires since the
adoption of the TBCA.' Though the supreme court has not construed
article 2.04, the holdings of the three civil appeals cases which have con-
strued the statute are consistent and should be followed by the higher
court.' Otherwise the inequity of the doctrine of general capacity would
be perpetuated and the legislative intent would be frustrated.'
As a matter of policy, intervention should be liberally granted in cases
such as Inter-Continental.' A multiplicity of suits will be avoided and any
damage to the third party dealing with the corporation will be minimized
while adequate protection will be afforded to shareholders.! However, if
corporations are allowed to circumvent article 2.04's proscription with the
simple artifice of collusive intervention by a "friendly" shareholder, the
statute will become meaningless. Thus intervenors should only be granted
relief if it is clearly demonstrated that they are acting in their own behalf.
S.C.S.
Criminal Law - Texas Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
- Right of Indigent Defendant to Court-Appointed Coun-
sel in Habeas Corpus Proceeding
In 1962 Turner was sentenced to the Ohio State Reformatory for the
crime of burglary. He was paroled in 1965, declared a parole violator
several months later, and confined in the Texas Department of Corrections
in 1966. Extradition papers were prepared and an executive warrant was
issued. In the ensuing habeas corpus proceeding under section 10 of the
Texas Uniform Criminal Extradition Act' Turner's requests for court-
appointed counsel were denied, although the record clearly indicated that
he was indigent. Turner was remanded to custody for extradition to the
state of Ohio. Held, reversed and remanded: An indigent person is en-
titled to representation by court-appointed counsel in a habeas corpus
proceeding under the Texas Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. In re
Turner, 410 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
Section 10 of the Texas Uniform Criminal Extradition Act requires
that the person arrested under an executive warrant be brought before a
judge who "shall inform him of the demand for his surrender and of
4 Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), aff'd, 397 S.W.2d
415 (Tex. 1965); Empire Steel Corp. v. Omni Steel Corp., 378 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) error ref. n.r.e. See also Spool Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 353 F.2d 263
(5th Cir. 1965).
a The issue was clearly presented in Whitten, note 4 supra, but the court affirmed on the
grounds of estoppel. 397 S.W.2d at 415-16; Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 861 (1966).
' See authorities cited supra note 2.
7See authorities cited supra notes 2, 3.
8 Ibid.
'TEX. CODE CRrm. PRoc. ANN. art. 51.13 (1965).
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the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand
and procure legal counsel."2 Although no express provision is made in the
statute for the appointment of counsel to represent indigent persons, the
court concluded that the legislature did not intend that the right to counsel
be limited to those individuals who are financially able. The court drew
support for its conclusion from a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court,"
which interpreted section 10 of the Illinois Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act.' The Illinois court required that counsel be appointed to represent
indigent persons who do not have the means to procure this assistance.
That court felt that counsel is necessary in a habeas corpus proceeding,
to consider such questions as "whether the various extradition papers are
in proper form, whether the arrested person is in fact a fugitive from
justice subject to extradition, and whether he is in fact a person charged
with a crime in the demanding State."' The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals agreed.
G.P.A.
Evidence - Deceased Witness - Admissibility in Civil
Trial of Testimony Given in Prior Criminal Trial
After Bryant was acquitted in a criminal arson trial, he brought suit
against a group of insurance companies who refused indemnity for his
fire losses because they believed he had intentionally caused the fire.
At the civil trial, the companies offered the transcribed testimony of a
witness at the previous arson trial who was now dead. Bryan objected to
the admission of such prior testimony, contending that it was hearsay.
The trial court admitted the prior testimony and Bryan appealed. Held,
affirmed: Testimony given in a prior criminal trial is admissible in a
subsequent civil action where the witness who gave the evidence at the
criminal proceeding is dead, provided that the issue was substantially the
same in both proceedings and that the party against whom the evidence
is presently offered was a party to both suits and had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. Bryant v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 411
S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
A well established exception to the hearsay rule is that relevant state-
ments made in a previous trial may be admitted in a later proceeding as
evidence of the truth of such statements when the witness is dead or
2Txx. Coon CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 10 (1961).
'People ex rel. Harris v. Ogilvie, 221 N.E.2d 265 (I11. 1966).
'Section 10 of the Illinois Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is similar in language to § 10
of the Texas Uniform Extradition Act.
5 221 N.E.2d at 267.
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unavailable.' The safeguards imposed upon this exception are that the
litigant who is adverse to the witness must have been a party to both
proceedings and must have had ample opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the first proceeding For cross-examination to be meaningful,
the issues in both cases must be substantially the same.
The present case is the first Texas decision on the question of whether,
under this hearsay exception, testimony given in a prior criminal case is
admissible in a subsequent civil case.' Bryant argued that the testimony
was not admissible since the issues in the two trials were different; the
issue in the criminal case concerned Bryant's "guilt" while that in the
civil action concerned "property" rights." The court felt, however, that
to define the issues as guilt and property would be to determine the ulti-
mate issue or result sought to be obtained by the litigation. The real issue
in both actions was recognized to be whether Bryant had set fire to or
had procured the burning of the building; Bryant, therefore, had had
ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to this issue.
G.W.O.
Taxation - Definition of "Eighty Per Cent in Value" Under
Section 1239
Parker sold certain depreciable personal property to a corporation of
which he owned 800 shares. Parker reported the gain on the sale of the
property to the corporation as a capital gain under section 1231 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Commissioner denied capital gain
treatment under section 12391 since Parker owned more than eighty per
'See, e.g., Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brittian, 402 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1966); Lone Star
Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681 (1941); Newton v. State, 202 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1947); Abston v. State, 141 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940); Mitchell v. State,
222 S.W. 983 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920); Bergin v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 617, 188 S.W. 423
(1916); Porch v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 7, 99 S.W. 1122 (1907); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lee,
165 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Security Realty & Dev. Co. v. Bunch, 143 S.W.2d 687
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Campbell v. Hicks, 83 S.W.2d 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error dismissed.
See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 480-501 (1954); 1 MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW O EVIDENCE
719-42 (2d ed. 1956).
2 Ibid. An additional safeguard, however dubious, is that the former testimony was given under
oath. MCCORMICK, Op. cit. supra note 1.
aBryant v. Trinity Universal Ins. C., 411 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
4 Ibid.
'an analogous situation was presented in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lee, 165 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942) error ref., a workman's compensation case. In the first trial, the issue had con-
cerned the extent of injuries; in the latter one, the issue was whether the injuries were so
extensive as to cause death. Testimony from the first proceeding was permitted because the issues in
both were substantially the same-they concerned the severity of the injuries.
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239.
(a) Treatment of Gain as Ordinary Income-In the case of exchange, directly or in-
directly, of property described in subsection (b)-
(1) between a husband and wife; or
(2) between an individual and a corporation more than 80 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of which is owned by such individual, his spouse, and
his minor children and minor grandchildren;
any gain recognized to the transferor from the sale or exchange of such property
1967]
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cent "in value" of all the outstanding stock of the corporation at the
time of sale. The other 200 authorized shares were subscribed to by Eaves.
But some of the share certificates had not been issued since Eaves had
paid only a portion of the subscription price. Before any of the shares
could be sold, they had to be offered first to the corporation as required
by the articles of incorporation. In addition, the shares issued to Eaves
carried a notice on their face that they were subject to a buy-sell agree-
ment between Parker and Eaves. This agreement provided that upon Eaves'
death or termination of employment his shares would be purchased by
Parker. The district court found that, as a matter of law, Parker did
not own more than eighty per cent "in value" of the outstanding shares.
Held, reversed and rendered: Under section 1239 of the Internal Revenue
Code eighty per cent in value is determined by looking at the actual fair
market value of the shares of the corporation and not merely at the
number of shares outstanding. Therefore, restrictions of a buy-sell agree-
ment and minority qualities may combine to have a depressing effect on
the value of minority shares. United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th
Cir. 1967).
Section 1239 was adopted to prevent a taxpayer from selling depreciated
property to his controlled corporation and taking capital gains treatment
on the sale. In such transactions the property would be depreciated by
the corporation, using the sales price as a basis. Thus, under section 1239
any such sale would be treated as ordinary gain if between a taxpayer
and a corporation in which eighty per cent in value of the outstanding
stock is owned by the individual, his spouse, his minor children and minor
grandchildren.! Both sales by the stockholder to the corporation and by
the corporation to the stockholder are taxed by section 1239,' but only if
the property in the hands of the transferee is depreciable under section
167.'
The requirement of eighty per cent ownership in value of the out-
standing stock is unique among the various sections of the 1954 Code
dealing with controlled corporations.5 In Trotz v. Commissioner' it was
held that the phrase "in value" must have some intended meaning. Thus,
if the eighty per cent determination is to be on the basis of the number
of shares outstanding, no reason exists for the use of the words "in
shall be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property which is neither
a capital asset nor property described in section 1231.
(b) Section Applicable Only to Sales or Exchanges of Depreciable Property-This
section shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange by a transferor of
property which in the hands of the transferee is property of a character which
is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.
2 See note 1 supra.
3 3B MERTEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.25 (1966).
4 See note I supra.
5INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 368(c), dealing with reorganizations, defines control as the
ownership of stock possessing at least eighty per cent of the total combined voting power of al
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least eighty per cent of the total number of shares
of all other classes of stock of the corporation. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 707(b)(2)
where a partnership is considered "controlled" if a partner owns more than eighty per cent of
the capital interest, or profits interest, in such partnership.
6361 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966).
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value." Such rationale led the court in Trotz to remand to the tax court
for a factual determination to ascertain if the stockholder owning seventy-
nine per cent of the total shares actually owned more than eighty per
cent "in value" of the shares.!
Parker is a logical application of the doctrine of the Trotz case: that
the actual value of the stock involved must be determined in order to
properly apply the eighty per cent test. In Trotz as well as in Parker
the minority shares were the subject of a buy-sell agreement." This factor
as well as the inherent deflation in value of minority as opposed to con-
trol stock' prompted the court in Parker to hold that since Parker owned
eighty per cent numerically of the stock, he must own more than eighty
per cent in value of the stock.
The significance of the Parker case is slightly diminished by the appli-
cation of section 124510 to sales of depreciable personal property made
after 1962. Gain on the sale of such property would be treated as ordi-
nary income to the extent of any depreciation taken in periods after 1961.
Thus it appears that the significance of section 1239 will be limited pri-
marily to transfers of real estate.1
However, as to transfers of real estate the Parker case will have real
significance. It would appear that any majority shareholder runs the
risk of section 1239 in any transaction with his company if he is found
to own more than eighty per cent of the fair market value of all the
stock of the corporation.
J.J.K.
Torts - Carpool Agreements Under the Texas Guest Statute
Pursuant to a carpool agreement, Autry, Spiering and two other men
alternated driving their respective automobiles to their mutual place of
work. An accident occurred while Spiering was driving home from work,
and Autry was injured. The trial court ruled that as a matter of law
Autry was a guest under the Texas Guest Statute,' and therefore granted
Spiering summary judgment because Autry had alleged only ordinary
negligence. Held, reversed and remanded: Under the parties' contractual
arrangement for reciprocal rides, Autry gave consideration to Spiering
'On the remand the tax court determined that on the basis of expert testimony the shares
of this particular construction company had no going concern value and would be worth only
their proportionate share of the assets or 79%. Harry Trotz, 5 67,139 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1967).
8 Such a contract necessarily has a depressing effect upon the value of the stock in the market.
Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1946); Worchester County Transp. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 134 F.2d 578 (Ist Cir. 1943).
' Minority stock interests in a "closed" corporation are usually worth much less than the
proportionate share of the assets to which they attach. Cravens v. Welch, 10 F. Supp. 94 (S.D. Cal.
1935).
'
0 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, S 1245.
" TAX MANAGEMENT No. 54, 2d A-58 (1963).
'TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b (1960).
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and was not a guest as a matter of law within the meaning of the Texas
Guest Statute. Autry v. Spiering, 407 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e.
The Texas Guest Statute precludes recovery against the owner or
operator of a motor vehicle by his "guest without payment"2 unless such
owner or operator caused the accident intentionally or was guilty of gross
negligence. To recover for injuries due to the operator's ordinary negli-
gence, the rider must be considered a non-guest or passenger. He must
therefore prove that he has "paid" for his transportation, although the
requisite payment need not be monetary.' The Texas courts early adopted
two mutually dependant tests for determining payment." First, there must
be a definite relationship between the rider and operator. Second, from
this relationship a definite, tangible benefit must flow to the operator and
the benefit must have motivated the operator to furnish the transporta-
tion.'
Since carpool agreements involve both business and social elements'
the question is whether there has been sufficient payment by the rider
to consider him a non-guest or passenger. Most courts which have decided
the question hold that the rider in a carpool of employees is not a guest.7
Autry v. Spierings is the first Texas case clearly dealing with a carpool
agreement among fellow employees. In an earlier Texas case which dealt
with a related problem, there was a fact question as to whether the
employees had had any agreement regarding automobile rides.' In another
Texas case, the plaintiff frequently rode to work with a fellow employee
and unsolicitedly and sporadically paid the driver for gas and other ex-
penses. Such payments were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from being
held a guest."0 The court was careful to note, however, that "there was
no regular carpool and appellant did not believe appellee was running a
taxi service."1 The decision was in accord with the established line of
cases that mere sharing of expenses does not alter the rider's status as a
2 Ibid.
'Schafer v. Stevens, 352 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Henry v. Henson, 174 S.W.2d
270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Johnson v. Srnither, 116 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); 33
TEXAS L. REV. 961 (1955).
' Since the Texas statute was copied from the Connecticut statute, the Texan courts turned to
Connecticut decisions for interpretation purposes and adopted the tests from the Connecticut cases.
See, e.g., Henry v. Henson, 174 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Franzen v. Jason, 166 S.W.2d
727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Linn v. Nored, 133 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Pfeiffer v.
Green, 102 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
'See, e.g., Cedziwooda v. Crane-Longely Funeral Chapel, 283 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1955); Burt
v. Lochausen, 249 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1952); Dietrich v. Young Co., 400 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; Wills v. Buchanan, 358 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Gregory
v. Otts, 329 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Burnett v. Howell, 294 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Henry v. Henson, 174 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Franzen
v. Jason, 166 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Raub v. Rowe, 119 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938) error ref.; Johnson v. Smither, 116 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dismissed;
Elkins v. Foster, 101 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
6 55 MICH. L. REV. 459 (1957).7 See Annot., 161 A.L.R. 917 (1946); 146 A.L.R. 640 (1943); 55 MICH. L. REV. 459 (1957).
8407 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
9 Webb v. Huffman, 320 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).




guest.1" Yet, where a driver had agreed to take the plaintiff to and from
work for two dollars a week, summary judgment in favor of the auto-
mobile owner was reversed."3
Autry v. Spiering" seems to be a logical culmination to these prior,
more indefinite cases. There still remains, however, the problem of carpool
agreements among other classes of operators and riders. The case of a car-
pool among parents in transporting children to and from school, for
example, has never been decided by any appellate court in Texas.1 Autry
should serve as an analogy here and these arrangements should be con-
sidered to provide the payment required by the Guest Statute. It is not
necessary that such payment be furnished directly by the rider. " Similarly,
arrangements between students who alternate driving each other to and
from school should result in the same conclusion.
P.R.K.
"Bonney v. San Antonio Transit Co., 325 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1959); Easter v. Wallace, 318
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Burnett v. Howell, 294 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Young v. Bynum, 260 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953);
McCarty v. Moss, 225 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Raub v. Rowe, 119 S.W.2d 190
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.; see also, Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1351 (1950); 14 Sw. L.J. 72, 77
(1960); 33 TEXAs L. REV. 961 (1955).
"3 Wills v. Buchanan, 358 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
'4407 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error Yef. n.r.e.
"' The only case found involving school children concerned the adult chaperone on a school
bus which had been chartered for a special trip. The court reasoned that the plaintiff-chaperone
was not a guest but was aboard in order to provide a service necessary to the trip itself. Freeman
v. Ham, 283 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
"6Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error
ref. n.r.e.; Freeman v. Ham, 283 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; 9 BAYLOR
L. REV. 238 (1957).
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